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Has Taylor failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion either by 
imposing concurrent fixed life sentences upon his guilty pleas to aggravated battery on 
a peace officer and aggravated assault on a peace officer with enhancements for use of 
a deadly weapon and being a persistent violator, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a 
reduction of his sentences? 
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Taylor Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
Three-time convicted felon Taylor attempted to elude Officer Dennis Clark after 
Officer Clark tried to initiate a traffic stop. (PSI, p.5. 1) Officer Clark pursued Taylor who 
was driving 100 miles per hour. (PSI, p.5.) When Taylor finally stopped, he got out of 
his car and shot at Officer Clark, hitting Officer Clark in the face with a shotgun pellet. 
(PSI, p.5; R., p.186; Exhibit 1.) Officer Clark got back in his patrol car and rammed 
Taylor's car. (R., p.186.) Taylor ran to his car and drove away as Officer Clark returned 
fire. (PSI, p.5; R., p.186.) Officer Clark and several other members of law enforcement 
continued pursuing Taylor. (PSI, p.5; R., p.186; generally Sircomm Radios - CD 1 
(dispatch traffic).) 
Officer Scott Novak, who was dispatched to assist Officer Clark, stopped his 
patrol car along the road ahead of Taylor. (R., p.48.) "Taylor drove directly towards 
Officer [Novak's] car at a high rate of speed causing Officer Novak to feel the imminent 
threat of great bodily harm or death from Taylor's actions." (R., p.48.) Officer Novak 
fired two shots at Taylor's car as Taylor continued eluding law enforcement. (R., p.187.) 
Taylor eventually crashed after being rammed again by Officer Clark. (PSI, p.3; 
R., p.187; Exhibits 2-4.) Officer Clark was transported via life-flight to have shotgun 
pellets surgically removed from his eye. (PSI, p.3.) As a result of the gunshot wound, 
Officer Clark is blind in his left eye. (R., p.187.) 
The state charged Taylor with aggravated battery on a peace officer, fleeing or 
attempting to elude a peace officer, unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"Confidential Exhibits 39844.pdf." 
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aggravated assault on a peace officer. (R., pp.116-118.) The state also filed an 
Information Part 2 for use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony and an 
Information Part 3 alleging Taylor is a persistent violator. (R., pp.119-121.) The parties 
stipulated to participate in mediation, which was ultimately unsuccessful. (R., pp.148-
149, 151, 165-166.) Pursuant to a subsequent plea agreement, Taylor pied guilty to 
aggravated battery on a peace officer and aggravated assault on a peace officer and 
admitted both the weapon and persistent violator enhancements. (R., pp.172-173.) 
The state dismissed the remaining counts. (R., p.172.) The court imposed concurrent 
unified life sentences. (R., pp.248-254.) Taylor filed a Rule 35 motion, which the district 
court denied. (R., pp.277-288, 298-301.) Taylor filed timely notices of appeal from the 
judgment and from the order denying Rule 35 relief. (R., pp.261-263, 304-306.) 
On appeal, Taylor claims his sentences are excessive, repeating the same 
arguments he did at the time of sentencing - citing his instability at the time of the 
events as a result of his "relationship trouble" with his girlfriend and his drug and alcohol 
use. (R., p.187; Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10, 12.) Taylor claims he wanted to kill himself 
and was hoping "the police officers would shoot and kill him." (R., p.187; Appellant's 
Brief, p.10.) Taylor also cites his remorse as a mitigating circumstance and appears to 
ask this Court to evaluate the district court's sentencing decision by considering 
sentences imposed in other cases and claiming his actions "demonstrated less 
culpability than any of the ... cases" he cites. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-10, 13.) Review 
of the applicable legal standards and the facts of this case show that Taylor has failed to 
show the district court abused its discretion in imposing concurrent fixed life sentences. 
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The applicable legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court's exercise of 
discretion are well-established. Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State 
v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 
139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). To carry this burden the appellant must show the 
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Windom, 150 Idaho at 
875, 253 P.3d at 312 (citations omitted). A sentence is reasonable, however, if it 
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. kl at 875-76, 253 
P.3d at 312-13; State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614,615 (2001). 
Due to the persistent violator enhancement, which Taylor admitted, his crimes 
were punishable by a maximum allowable sentence of fixed life imprisonment. I.C. § 
19-2514. Because the concurrent fixed life sentences imposed upon Taylor's 
convictions are within the statutory limit, Taylor bears the burden on appeal of showing 
his sentences are excessive. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 604, 768 P.2d 1331, 
1337 (1989). On appeal, the question before this Court is not what sentence it would 
have imposed, but rather, whether the district court abused its discretion. State v. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008) (citing State v. Toohill, 
103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982)); see also Windom, 150 Idaho 
at 875, 253 P.3d at 312 ("[W]here reasonable minds might differ, the discretion vested 
in the trial court will be respected, and this Court will not supplant the views of the trial 
court with its own."). Although Taylor's sentence is unquestionably weighty, he has not 
demonstrated from the record any abuse of discretion in the district court's 
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determination that a fixed life term of imprisonment was not only warranted, but also 
necessary, under the facts of this case. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: "To impose a fixed life sentence requires a 
high degree of certainty that the perpetrator could never be safely released back into 
society or that the nature of the offense requires that the individual spend the rest of his 
life behind bars." Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253 P.3d at 313 (citing Stevens, 146 
Idaho at 149, 191 P.3d at 227; State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 672, 978 P.2d 227, 232 
(1999)) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted); accord State v. Perez, 145 Idaho 
383, 388, 179 P.3d 346, 351 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 
638, 759 P.2d 926, 929 (Ct. App. 1988)) (a fixed life sentence "should be regarded as a 
sentence requiring a high degree of certainty - certainty that the nature of the crime 
demands incarceration until the perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty that the 
perpetrator never, at any time in his life, could be safely released."). This "high degree 
of certainty" is generally satisfied where "the offense is so egregious that it demands an 
exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence, or if the offender so utterly 
lacks rehabilitative potential that imprisonment until death is the only feasible means of 
protecting society." Perez, 145 Idaho at 388, 179 P.3d at 351 (emphasis added). The 
record clearly shows the existence of both of these circumstances in this case. 
In deciding concurrent fixed life sentences were appropriate, the district court 
recognized the standards applicable to such a sentence and found that both criteria 
necessary for the imposition of such a sentence were satisfied in this case. With 
respect to the question of whether Taylor could ever "be safely released back into 
society," Windom, supra, the district court noted Taylor's lengthy criminal history and 
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that he has failed at numerous rehabilitative efforts. The court stated: "You were, in 
fact, on probation at the time that these offenses were committed. Certainly, numerous 
attempts have been made to rehabilitate you .... " (Tr., p.84, Ls.21-24.) The court 
continued: 
In 2002 was your first felony conviction and it was at that time you 
were afforded the rider program. It was noted that you were a disciplinary 
problem then, and yet the department indicated it was reluctantly 
recommending probation. 
And, certainly, it was not long after you were placed back out on 
probation that your probation was violated and your sentence was 
reimposed. And then you were again found in the penitentiary setting to 
be a disciplinary problem, and the parole commission elected to pass you 
to top your time in 2008. 
And then once you topped your time in 2008 and were out, it wasn't 
long before you were back within the criminal justice system in 2009 and 
2010 for your second and third felony convictions; and yet even then you 
were afforded once again the opportunity of probation. And it was again 
while you were on probation that Officer Clark and Officer Novak had the 
encounter with you. 
And, certainly, this court recognizes that you've been afforded 
every opportunity to be a productive member of society, to change your 
behavior and to be a good father, to be a good son, a good husband, but 
that has not proven to be the case. 
(Tr., p.85, L.19 - p.86, L.19.) 
In terms of rehabilitative potential, in addition to the history summarized by the 
court, Taylor has 30 misdemeanor convictions, including convictions for driving under 
the influence, contempt of court, disturbing the peace, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, inattentive driving, and fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer. 
(PSI, pp.7-13.) Taylor's prior rehabilitative programming includes MRT class, Cognitive 
Self Change, Breaking Barriers, and a 21-day treatment program at the Walker Center. 
(PSI, pp.14-15, 19.) Notably, Taylor "was unable to pass the competency tests" for 
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Cognitive Self Change and, following his stint at The Walker Center, Taylor only 
managed to stay sober for two days. (PSI, pp.14, 19.) Consistent with, and explanatory 
of, Taylor's unsuccessful participation in past programming, during the GAIN-I 
evaluation, Taylor "reported he would not participate in treatment if incarcerated." (PSI, 
p.62 (emphasis added).) 
While in the retained jurisdiction program, Taylor was a "disciplinary problem" 
and, "[a]t times, his behavior ... resulted in disruption of the orderly operation of the 
institution." (PSI, p.14.) Later, while incarcerated in prison after his probation was 
revoked for absconding supervision and failing to participate in programming, Taylor 
"continued to be a disciplinary problem, receiving DORs for tattooing (3), possessing a 
sharp instrument, disobedience to orders (5), possession of unauthorized property, 
simple battery, harassment, and group disruption." (PSI, p.15.) 
Given Taylor's history and his expressed unwillingness to undertake any efforts 
toward positive change, it can hardly be said that the district court erred in concluding 
Taylor could never be safely released into the community. This, alone, warranted the 
fixed life sentences imposed by the court. However, Taylor's life sentences are also 
justified as a result of the egregious nature of his offenses. Windom, supra. As noted 
by the district court, Taylor "not only put [the officers] lives at risk[]," he "put the lives of 
the community at risk." (Tr., p.87, Ls.4-7.) That no officer or citizen died as a result of 
Taylor's actions does not make his crimes any less egregious. As aptly noted by the 
district court, it did "not need to wait ... until [Taylor] does in fact kill someone to 
determine whether a fixed life sentence is appropriate." (Tr., p.83, Ls.19-23.) 
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The allegedly mitigating circumstances cited by Taylor do not demonstrate an 
abuse of discretion. Taylor's claimed distress over his "relationship trouble" comes 
nowhere close to explaining, much less excusing, his behavior, which was entirely 
consistent with his criminal history before his "relationship trouble." The state is also 
extremely skeptical of Taylor's after-the-fact assertion that he wanted to commit "suicide 
by cop" given that such a desire is inconsistent with the fact that he actually shot at the 
police officer first, which could easily have impaired the officer's ability to shoot back, 
and given that Taylor fled from both Officer Clark and Officer Novak when they opened 
fire. Even taking Taylor's claimed intent at "face value," the district court noted that 
putting the officers in the position of shooting Taylor "leaves lasting and emotional 
impact upon the lives of those officers." {Tr., p.87, Ls.7-11.) 
Taylor's history of drug and alcohol abuse also fails to establish an abuse of 
sentencing discretion. The court acknowledged Taylor's "significant history" of such 
abuse, but such a history did not require the court to disregard the need to protect the 
community, particularly in light of all of Taylor's failed treatment opportunities and his 
continued disinterest in getting treatment. (Tr., p.78, Ls.12-22.) 
It is also difficult to accept Taylor's claims of remorse given his lengthy 
involvement with the criminal justice system. It is likewise difficult, if not impossible, to 
accept Taylor's claim that he did not intend to threaten Officer Novak or that he really 
only wanted Officer Clark to shoot and kill him. (Tr., p.75, Ls.1-3; PSI, p.6.) What 
seems more likely is that Taylor is remorseful for ruining his own life, not Officer Clark's. 
(See Tr., p.75, Ls.6-8.) In any event, Taylor's remorse, assuming he has any, does not 
change the fact that fixed life is an appropriate sentence under the circumstances. 
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As for Taylor's reliance on lesser sentences imposed in other cases, comparative 
sentencing is not appropriate because: "It is well settled that not every offense in like 
category calls for identical punishment; there may properly be a variation in sentences 
between different offenders, depending on the circumstances of the crime and the 
character of the defendant in his or her individual case." State v. Pederson, 124 Idaho 
179, 183, 857 P.2d 658,662 (Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
Taylor also complains that although "the district court indicated it did not 
sentence for tattoos, it went on to draw a conclusion about Mr. Taylor based on the 
tattoos." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Taylor argues "this displays an abuse of discretion, 
and sentencing based on a lack of the exercise of reason, and demonstrates that the 
district court sentenced based on inflammatory factors and an argument based on 
revenge and other impermissible factors." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) In a related claim, 
Taylor contends the "prosecutor's repeated statements regarding tattoos, and Mr. 
Taylor's appearance" "constituted an inflammatory attack, and bordered on attempted 
testimony by the prosecutor regarding the meaning of the tattoos." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.13.) Taylor further asserts the prosecutor's "inflammatory comments argued 
essentially for a sentenced based on revenge, rather than based on the permissible 
sentencing factors." (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.) Both of these arguments are without 
merit. 
Regarding Taylor's numerous tattoos, the prosecutor commented on the tattoo 
on the left side of Taylor's neck, which reads: "Fuck Authority." (Tr., p.42, L.19 - p.43, 
L.3; PSI, p.4.) The prosecutor expressed his belief that that particular tattoo said "quite 
a bit about Mr. Taylor's attitude toward th[e] court, toward law enforcement in general 
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and towards society." (Tr., p.42, L.23 - p.43, L.1.) The prosecutor also noted Taylor's 
"peckerwood" tattoo and said that although Taylor denied gang activity, that tattoo is "a 
gang affiliation from prison." (Tr., p.46, Ls.16-19.) Finally, the prosecutor stated: 
Since [Taylor has gotten out of Cottonwood,] he's gotten all this artwork, 
all this gang related artwork, all this artwork that is designed to scare 
people. 
I mean I'm kind of used to it, but can you imagine a family sitting 
down in a restaurant and this guy walking in and sitting down next to 
them? ... You know, they're going to pull their kids a little closer to them. 
And I'll tell you I think that's exactly what Mr. Taylor wants. He has made 
his persona fear, and that's another good reason for putting him in prison 
for the rest of his life. 
(Tr., p.55, Ls.13-25.) 
The "artwork" on which the prosecutor commented presumably refers to Taylor's 
potentially visible tattoos2 that cover his entire head and both arms, and, in addition to 
"Fuck Authority" and "peckerwood," Taylor's tattoos include "white" over his right 
eyebrow and "trash" over his left eyebrow, a "skull with tribal, swaztika [sic]," "pure" and 
"wood" across his knuckles, a tear drop on his left cheek, "666" on his right cheek, and 
"DFL" and "5150" on the back of his neck. (PSI, pp.3-4.) 
Regarding Taylor's tattoos, the court stated: 
You have a long history of not respecting the norms of society as 
well as authority, which -- and while I recognize that I don't sentence 
someone for tattoos, certainly in some eyes that is artwork. However, I 
think that there are some expressions of words, and while you have every 
right to say them, certainly, it suggests to me that when you write across 
your forehead "white trash," you have no respect for yourself and you 
have no respect for others. And when you write along your neck "F" 
authority," [sic] you have no respect for society and you have no respect 
for law enforcement. 
2 It is highly unlikely the prosecutor was suggesting that families at restaurants would 
respond to the tattoos on Taylor's chest, stomach, and penis, as it is doubtful that Taylor 
exposes those tattoos while in a restaurant. (PSI, pp.3-4.) 
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And, frankly, while you've done nothing to disrespect this court, I 
have to realize that in reality I don't think you have respect for authority, 
and I think that that is carried out by your behavior in the penitentiary 
setting. 
(Tr., p.85, Ls.2-18.) 
Taylor's invitation to disregard the district court's express statement that it was 
not sentencing him for his tattoos and assume instead that is precisely what the court 
did should be rejected. See State v. Mason, 102 Idaho 866,869-70 643 P.2d 78, 81-82 
(1982) ("There is a presumption of regularity which attaches to the trial court's actions.") 
(citations omitted). Further, even if the court drew certain conclusions about Taylor 
because of his tattoos, Taylor has failed to explain why this was improper. In fact, there 
was nothing improper in relying on Taylor's "Fuck Authority" tattoo as evidence of 
Taylor's attitude toward the laws of this state and those that enforce those laws. See 
State v. Leon, 142 Idaho 705, 709, 132 P.3d 462, 466 (Ct. App. 2006) ("It is 
fundamental that a sentencing court may properly conduct an inquiry broad in scope, 
largely unlimited, either as to the kind of information it may consider or the source from 
which it may come.") (citations omitted). 
Taylor's complaints about the prosecutor's comments about his tattoos are also 
not well-taken. He has cited no authority to support any assertion that the comments 
were improper or constituted misconduct. Nor has Taylor identified what comments the 
prosecutor made that asked for "a sentence based on revenge" versus retribution, a 
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recognized goal of sentencing. There was nothing in the prosecutor's sentencing 
argument that is legally prohibited.3 Taylor has failed to show otherwise. 
The district court considered all of the relevant information, the applicable legal 
standards, and acted within its discretion in imposing concurrent fixed life sentences. 
Taylor next asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
motion. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.) If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, 
a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court 
reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 
Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Taylor must "show 
that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." kl Taylor has failed to 
satisfy his burden. 
Taylor concedes, as he must, that he did not present any new information in 
support of his Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's Brief, p.15; R., pp.277-287.) Rather, Taylor 
asked the court for leniency in the form of an "opportunity at parole,"4 and the court 
denied the request. (R., pp.277-301.) Taylor contends "the district court should have 
reduced his sentence pursuant to the Rule 35 motion because the sentence was 
3 Even if this Court concludes that the prosecutor made inappropriate comments at 
sentencing, the question Taylor has presented on appeal is whether the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion, not whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4 (issues on appeal).) As explained, the court, which clearly 
understood the relevant sentencing considerations and the bounds of its discretion (see 
generally Tr., pp.76-77), Taylor has failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
4 The memorandum filed in support of Taylor's Rule 35 motion also included an Eighth 
Amendment argument (R., pp.281-283), which is not raised on appeal and which, in any 
event, would not be new information but only an argument in support of sentencing 
relief. 
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excessive as originally imposed," and relies on the arguments he made in support of his 
excessive sentence claim. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.) Because Taylor did not 
provide any "new" information to support his request for a sentence reduction and 
because Taylor failed to establish his sentence was excessive as imposed, Taylor has 
also failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Taylor's convictions and 
sentences and the district court's order denying Taylor's Rule 35 motion for a reduction 
of sentence. 
DATED this 18th day of April, 2013. 
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